This pst is by Prof Sean Danaher and was on Progressive Pulse last week. It is far too good not to share a little more widely, with Sean's permission:
History, as it is taught in British schools, remembers 1914 as a the year WWI started. WWI was of course a horrific event, but less is remembered of the political turmoil at the time. As Robert Saunders writes in “Breaking the parliamentary machine”: lessons of the 1914 crisis:
The crisis of 1914 far eclipsed Brexit, and brought Britain closer to revolution than at any time since the 17th century. The Times called it “one of the greatest crises in the history of the British race”, while Conservative election literature warned that Britain might soon be “stained with the blood of civil war”. Yet it offers some striking similarities with the present, and a warning of what could lie ahead.
The article is beautifully written and is well worth reading in full. Saunders goes on to explain:
The trigger was the election of December 1910. For the only time in British history, the result was a dead heat: the governing Liberal Party and its Conservative and Unionist opponents both won 272 seats. The Unionists won more votes, and a series of by-elections quickly made them the largest single grouping; but the outcome was a minority Liberal government, dependent chiefly on the Irish Nationalists. The price of Irish support was Home Rule, giving Ireland its own parliament with control over domestic legislation.
The Irish had being demanding Home Rule (very similar in the range of powers to the now Scottish Parliament) for decades, attempts could and had been blocked by the Upper Chamber, but the Parliament Act of 1911 stripped the House of Lords of its veto. The third home rule bill after a glacial and bitterly fought, many stage, campaign in parliament, was due to become law in January 1915.
Ireland effectively had Home Rule up to 1800, when the Acts of Union (Ireland) were passed. Though not perfect, Ireland was a wealthy and populous country.
The Union was a disaster for Ireland. In 1800 Dublin was the 6th largest city in Europe (Table 1), sandwiched between Amsterdam and Lisbon, and one of the wealthiest. While obviously far behind London, it was more than twice the size of the next two largest cities in Britain: Manchester and Edinburgh. In 1800 Ireland has over twice the population of the Netherlands (5M as opposed to 2M) and over half the population of England (c 8M).
By 1914 Dublin was an impoverished slum and smaller in population than Belfast. Ireland had a lower population in 1914 than in 1800 (c 4.4M), whereas England's population had grown by a factor of four to c 36M and the Netherlands by over a factor of three to c 6.2M. Something clearly had gone disastrously wrong, this was the Great Famine from 1845-1848. This was by far the greatest peace time calamity in 19th century Europe, about 1M died and 2M emigrated. It was so badly mismanaged by the London government that it created resentment on a monumental scale, still present especially among the North American diaspora.
Home rule was backed by a super-majority in Ireland, but the one part of Ireland that had prospered through the Union, the NE corner surrounding Belfast, was implacably opposed. Approximately 80% of the industrial capacity of Ireland was concentrated in this region in 1914. It had for example the largest shipyard in the world, Harland and Wolff, most famous for building the Titanic.
The NE had a Protestant majority who hated Home Rule and started their own totally illegal private army, the Ulster Volunteers. Far from being condemned by the Tories they were backed to the hilt. Andrew Bonar Law leader of His Majesty's Loyal Opposition was photographed inspecting the Volunteers, who pledged to bring down the third Home Rule Bill — an Act of Parliament.
Again quoting Saunders article:
Crucially, the Conservatives did not simply argue that Home Rule was wrong. They rejected the democratic legitimacy of parliament, which they accused of defying the will of the people. Party literature told voters that “the House of Commons does not truly represent the people, nor do its votes represent the opinions of the electorate”. Conservatives talked openly of “breaking the parliamentary machine”, pitting “the Supremacy of the People” against the “paid puppets” of the House of Commons. Parliament was urged to surrender its functions to a referendum, to ensure that MPs could not “cut ‘the people' out of the constitution”.
The constitutional crisis at the time was averted by WWI, which seemed almost a blessing initially. Indeed some historians argue that the “Irish Question” played a far greater part in Britain's willingness to go to war than is generally acknowledged. Sadly WWI, far from being over by Christmas, turned out to be a cataclysmic disaster.
Aftermath
Civil war was averted in Britain, but Ireland was not so lucky. Far from being deterred by the Ulster Volunteers, a host of pro Irish Independence paramilitary groups were formed, leading to the 1916 Rising, a war of independence and the peace Treaty of 1921. Ireland was partitioned between the 26 county Free State and the 6 county Northern Ireland. (A good podcast on the period by the Irish Passport team is available here).
The actual treaty granted nothing like the full independence of the entire island of Ireland, with the 26 counties granted Dominion Status within the British Empire and NI granted Home Rule (a protestant parliament for a protestant people). Irish pragmatists saw it as “the freedom to obtain freedom”. Lloyd George, the PM, is reported to have said “I may have just signed my political death warrant” to which Michael Collins (the lead figure on the Irish side) replied “I may have signed my actual death warrant”.
The Treaty was totally unacceptable to many in Ireland, in modern parlance far too many red lines had been crossed and the result was Civil War. Collins proved very prescient as he was killed during the Civil War in August 1922 at Béal na Bláth.
The Free State could be fairly accurately described as an impoverished wreck by the end of the Civil War. Many in Northern Ireland and Britain saw it as too poor and too small to succeed on its own. Very similar to today's arguments on Scottish Independence (but with considerably more justification). Northern Ireland, with as previously stated, 80% of the island's industrial capacity and part of the greatest empire the world had ever seen, seemed destined for success.
It did not turn out that way. As Prof Brendan O'Leary discusses in his definitive three volume A Treatise on Northern Ireland, by 1940 Northern Ireland was essentially bankrupt, where the Irish Free State was a much greater success. Whilst still not wealthy, very firm and robust democratic foundations had been laid for future prosperity. (For those with neither the time or money to read the Treatise there is an excellent Irish Times podcast available here).
Winding rapidly forward to the current day, the two economies are not really comparable, with IE not only being way ahead of NI but also Britain on international metrics such as the Human Development Index IE 4th, UK 14th. GDP per capita is over twice as high in IE than NI and I would be surprised if even 8% of the island's industrial capacity was based in NI.
“The freedom to obtain freedom” analysis has turned out to have been correct in retrospect. Ireland is a modern successful country with considerable state and diplomatic capacity, which has been used very successfully throughout the Brexit process, perhaps most clearly on display at PM Johnson's visit to Dublin on Monday. Ian Dunt tweeted regarding their post-meeting statements: “Quite painful to watch. Varadkar conducting himself as a leader and grounding his comments in reality. Johnson looks like a child who won a Willy Wonka ticket to appear alongside him”.
Are There Parallels to be Drawn to the Current Crisis?
The current crisis seems to be a pale shadow of 1914, there are no major private armies being raised. Again however there are bitter arguments about the supremacy of parliament vs. “the people”. The country seems, or at least its political class, bitterly divided. It is possible however that Dmitry Grozoubinski has it correct in that the vast majority of the British Electorate just want Brexit to go away (Fig. 1).
There is an Irish dimension, with the Irish again holding, until the dramatic withdrawal of the whip from 21MPs, the balance of power, but this time the DUP rather than the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP). Will the DUP be eventually betrayed by Westminster just as the IPP was in 1915? There are rumours that something like the NI only version of the Backstop may be resurrected.
There are obvious parallels between the Withdrawal Agreement (WA) and the 1921 Treaty. For many the WA is nothing like the “cake and eat it” promises made during the Referendum Campaign. Signing up to the WA however is unlikely to unleash civil war in Britain, though not signing may through the introduction of a hard border in Ireland, triggering considerable violence.
The Treaty was signed ultimately because of power asymmetry. Ireland was under no illusion that it was far weaker than Britain. The realisation of the power asymmetry between the EU and the UK seems not to dawned on many of the Brexiters, but will mean that any eventual treaty will be more weighted towards the EU than the UK.
The political situation in Britain was saved by WWI. There is nothing like a good war to unite the country as Margaret Thatcher found during the Falklands War. Hopefully starting a War is not part of Cumming's master-plan.
The Irish dimension is likely to play an important part, not least because Phil Hogan of Fine Gael and a close allay of Varadkar has been nominated as EU trade commissioner and will be the EU representative at the WTO and in charge of a future EU trade deal with the UK. He is known as the “Bruiser” and a wily operator. The fact that he will be supported by Sabine Weyand, who was Barnier's right hand “man” during the negotiating of the withdrawal agreement, may fill some on the UK side with dismay.
Hopefully Marx's view that “history repeats the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce” will not come true, but it is inevitable that Britain will need eventually to come to terms with the limitations of its power, as Ireland did in 1921, hopefully sooner rather than later.
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Fascinating read ,as an independence for Scotland supporter some of the parallels to the present debacle are uncanny and can only reiterate the hope that a war is not the establishment solution.
And the next election was called the coupon election where MPs were given a coupon to ID them as pro UK. And if you did not get the coupon you were seen as against the UK.
A split was made that went over all parties and all manifestos.
Robert Saunders is an acute and erudite historian. I was privileged to attend a lecture he gave on the 1975 Referendum last year, and can thoroughly recommend his “Yes to Europe! The 1975 Referendum and Seventies Britain” (2018), which is an invaluable source informing our current predicament.
The Spanish flu pandemic of 1918 will have also had some influence.
I remember my shock ( and grief at the lost time ) upon first discovering Scotland was well on the way to Home Rule around the same time ( maybe about a year behind ) as Ireland. I don’t seem to have kept a link or screenshot ( tut! ) but here is Hansard 1914 when the subject was raised one time. I gather a Home Rule Bill was debated 1913. World War 1 seems to have stymied the progress.
https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1914/feb/24/home-rule-scotland-1
Glad to have read this. All good for my knowledge bank. I doubt the government at Westminster will take a similar view.
Fascinating link – worth reading, as is this https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1913/may/30/government-of-scotland-bill
What a fascinating insight into a historical parallel. Plus ça change…. Much verbiage, little actual progress. It appears David Mundell modelled his style in his tenure of the post of Secretary of State for Scotland on that of his 1914 predecessor McKinnon Wood: insincere statements, frequent denials and voltes-faces of policy.
True
Hmmmm…. ?
Sean does seem to have a thorough grounding in the Irish situation throughout its turbulent recent history…..
Which is considerably more than can said for Mr Johnson for whom Ireland seems to represent “a quarrel in a far away country between people of whom we know nothing.”
It is good that you are sharing Sean Danaher’s observations here. I have one or two observations of my own.
I was at an economics policy conference in Ireland over the weekend and the bafflement and concern at the antics of the British political class among the officials, practitioners and opinion formers present was palpable and pervasive. The hope was that some sense would prevail eventually. But there were some dissenting voices. Dan O’Brien of the Irish Independent newspaper and the Institute for European and International Affairs made a good case that (1) the UK will never accept any form of the benighted “backstop”, (2) a hard Brexit is almost inevitable and (3) after an initial period of chaos and disruption any malign impacts will dissipate as firms, agencies and individuals find ways to develop alternative arrangements. Life will go on. A smoothly functioning trading regime will be replaced by something inferior. But it could take a long time.
My second observation is that while it is insightful, as Sean does, to look at the current imbroglio through an Irish historical prism it doesn’t fully capture the relevance of the political turmoil of the inter-war years to the current situation. Once the Treaty of 1921 was being implemented, the Irish had terminated their civil war and the border was fixed in exchange for writing off Ireland’s imputed share of the British national debt the British political class forgot about Ireland. It took Ireland (north and south) out of the British parliamentary system where it often had disproportionate impacts over the previous 70 years.
The political battle then focused on Labour’s inexorable displacement of the Liberals and on the Tories response (epitomised by Churchill’s “re-rat” when he switched back to the Tories from the Liberals). We are now experiencing a similar period of political turmoil for the major parties and Brexit is providing the crucible. This will also take some time to play out. But again, life will go on.
Finally, Sean is correct to highlight the similarity between the asymmetries of the power relationships (Ireland relative to Britain then and the UK relative to the EU now). But the resolve being demonstrated by the EU27, while impressive, is fragile and exercising it too forcefully is not in the interests of the EU. With Britain out those in the EU advancing greater political and economic integration may feel empowered, and it is true that President Macron has been very successful in terms of promoting his EU vision and high level appointments (in the face Chancellor Merkel’s political decline). But serious fault-lines remain and the EU may find it has to pursue a core/non-core (or multi-tier) structure if it is to survive and prosper. It may regret not exploring these options when David Cameron was seeking to modify the terms of the UK’s membership.
Mr Hunt,
I am not sure what you are actually proposing here, and perhaps I misunderstand the real import of your final paragraph, but my reading of it suggests it is alarmingly insouciant. Allow me to attempt to tease out what your argument seems to imply: perhaps – indeed I hope that I have misunderstood your argument; intended or unintended? You appear to argue “After Brexit, life goes on” in Britain, and nothing much changes; stay calm and carry on is the message, there is nothing to see here: afternoon tea, cricket and evensong are forever. In the EU however, all is “fragile” and on the brink of failure: centralisers in the EU “may feel empowered”; “serious fault-lines remain” in the EU; “It may regret not” modifying the terms of membership, or exit for the UK. In short, strong and stable Britain is confronted by a brittle and disintegrating EU.
Nice try, but this appears to be a lop-sided, smoke-and-mirrors representation of the UK. The more plausible reality, I suggest is that of a grotesque, intellectually bankrupt, profoundly divided UK, which has negotiated its exit from the EU with astonishing incompetence (over and over again making precisely the same errors); demonstrating only profound, unapologetic hubris, vacuous arrogance and total inadequacy in basic negotiation skills. The calm, stoic UK you imagine, in reality represents the final, long, slow, disordered, retreat of an out-of-date British Union, into the dazed, bewildered and close embrace of mere fiction.
It is the reality of Union within the UK that has “serious fault-lines”; a Union that may regret not modifying its relationship with Scotland (to say nothing of Ireland and Wales here); a Scotland that quite obviously feels increasingly empowered to dispense with a failing Westminster Parliamentary system altogether: a Scotland confronted by a flawed and undermined British constitution that is increasingly incapable of acknowledging the importance of the Scottish constitutional tradition to the continuation of the UK. You then appear to ‘take the biscuit’, with the apparent regress to a long discredited ‘balance-of-power’ politics by the UK within Europe, in order, we may surmise to further the ‘freedom’ of the UK to exploit unfettered, political and economic piracy anywhere it chooses. I acknowledge that such an argument has a long history; but it will not do.
It would be better for all if Britain could have embraced the EU, and even led its initial development when it had the opportunity, from 1948. In 1940 Churchill offered Union with France; in 1948 Britain turned its back on the Coal and Steel Community, for the fag-end of Empire. It has been turning its back ever since; it seems to have joined the EEC only to filibuster it. It could still have helped shape the balance of development between centre and peripheries of the EC-EU throughout the last forty years of membership. It chose not to; it didn’t promote anything but its own, narrow, filibustering interest. Britain’s membership of the EU was always insincere, and that is the tragedy. It chose Brexit. It now walks away. This is what real diplomatic, constitutional and economic failure looks like: a failure to engage, a failure of sincerity. Very well; so be it. Little England awaits. The rest of us must look elsewhere.
Thanks John
In reply to John S Warren:
Mr Warren,
Many thanks for your considered response. It is clear that you devoted time and effort.
Although my comments were an attempt to respond to Sean Danaher’s insightful post and to attempt shift the prism of history a little, it may surprise you to find that I agree with most of the contentions you advance; and where I might disagree there are only questions about the extent or degree to which your contentions have validity or salience. But I fully accept that all of your contentions have considerable validity.
It is regrettable that the debate has become so polarised. I fully accept that the UK’s relationship with the EU (and its earlier manifestations) has been, and continues to be, as you describe. There have been only a few episodes that stand as exceptions to this record of perfidy, insincerity, wilful ignorance, public abuse and sheer bloody-mindedness. For example, there is the role of Frank (Lord) Cockfield as one of the UK’s two commissioners in the ’80s who is generally regarded as the “Father of the Single Market”. There are sadly too few similar episodes. But they are the exceptions that prove the rule.
It is unfortunate that you detected a note of insouciance in my comments. That was not my intention. Life will go on. But I am in no doubt that it will be worse in a variety of ways for most citizens and residents. However, a majority of the electorate voted to withdraw from the EU. Authorising the conduct of this referendum was the most profoundly stupid and damaging political decisions of the modern era. Margaret Thatcher, as leader of the opposition, vehemently opposed authorising the conduct of the 1975 referendum and echoed Clement Attlee who described them as a device of dictators and demagogues. Referendums may be made compatible with parliamentary democracy only if in the event voters choose to change the status quo there is a clear outline and specification of the legislation that will be enacted to give effect to this change in the status quo.
And we still don’t know precisely what legislation will be enacted. Parliament has thrice rejected the legislation intended to enact what the May government agreed with the EU. Since the UK has decided to continue along the referendum route to discover the democratic plurality in favour of either remaining or leaving it would be pefectly appropriate to conduct a second referendum if or when the legislation on withdrawal arrangements is drafted. Voters could then decide whether to leave the EU on those terms or remain and if voters were resolved to leave Parliament would then be obliged to enact the enabling legislation.
ironically, among all the parties and factions only the Labour party has, slowly and painfully, come to this position.
Finally, with regard to the EU, I am very uncomfortable with the stance of those who uncritically demand to remain. Jeremy Corbyn was pilloried when he gave the EU 7 to 7 and a half out of 10. I would struggle to award it so high a mark. But I would never ever support the case for withdrawal. I would argue, and continue to argue, to engage more intensively and effectively. If the EU didn’t exist something very like it would have been invented. Having 28 heads of state and government in one room hammering out decisions on matters that affect ordinary people across the continent may be messy and time-consuming and they may, from time to time, get it wrong (though decisions are frequently revisited), but it is the only way we will survive and prosper in an era of competing power blocs and global challenges.
My criticisms of the EU are legion and they are shared by many. But they are intended as constructive and there is no value in rehearsing them here. However, the fault-lines to which I referred are real. One of the most salient is that between member-states in favour of ever closer political and economic union and those who are uneasy are opposed. The UK falls in to the latter camp. From 2012 the Conservative/Lib Dem coalition conducted a wide ranging “Balance of Competences” review across all departments and broadly concluded that the balance was appropriate. But a clear line was drawn against any further re-balancing that would increase EU competences or prerogatives.
Now, with the UK on the point of withdrawal, the smaller member-states who are uneasy about closer political and economic union (particularly in the absence of some key monetary and economic institutional developments) lack the heft that the UK provided. And so the Northern Alliance has emerged. And there are other fault-lines. That is why I would advocate a core/non-core or multi-tier institutional development of the EU or else the fault-lines will widen and deepen.
But sadly it looks like the UK will be on the outside and will play no role in this vital institutional development.
Let me be clear that I do not know a Remainer who does not want reform
But then, that’s true of the UK as well
@ Paul
Just a pedantic, but potentially vital correction to be made:
A majority of the electorate did not vote to leave; a majority of voters voted to leave.
I’m not trying to pedal this as an excuse for reversing the referendum (there are plenty of much more valid reasons) but I feel it is important to use precise language when talking about anything Brexit/EU related. Otherwise, overblown legitimacy is lent to the marginal result.
A fascinating read Richard, thank you for posting (hosting?) this piece of history.
Not exactly relevant to the point being made, but relevant to the history of NI theme, I watched this last night – probably too near bedtime, in fact – the BBC have made and/or broadcast ‘The Secret History of the Troubles’, a documentary, that it is broadcasting in NI in 7 parts, this is part 1:
https://eurofree3.wordpress.com/2019/09/14/saturday-film-bbc-spotlight-a-secret-history-of-the-troubles-part-1/
The blog-owner that has posted it gives a brief description of it, in case you don’t want to watch it (it’s fairly long >1hr). (I don’t watch tv any more, so maybe it has been broadcast elsewhere and I don’t know about it, so apologies if you’ve seen it!).
Thanks for this
I will try to take a look
Contrary
This series is also being broadcast on BBC4, the next episode is tonight at 21:00.
Mr Hunt,
Thank you for your considered and measured response. Unfortunately this discussion is not typical of Brexit. I may disagree with some of your observations, but insufficiently to make a rebuttal necessary. The EU is far from perfect, but there is no Union which is, or candidly could be “perfect”: it is not within human nature or wisdom to deliver perfection, but it is necessary to have the EU, as I think you acknowledge. Unfortunately I am less sure that the Union that is Britain is “necessary” – to Scotland at least.
I do not see the Brexit problem as essentially a matter of the flawed general appeal to referendums. The ‘problem’ is rather essentially a matter of the flawed nature of our constitution, which has not aged well. We have an archaic and manifestly dysfunctional constitution that lacks the capacity for wisdom (or change) that was available to James Madison and the Federalists in the 18th century; with Britain as the model not to be followed. No wise constitution, devised for a genuine, modern democracy would allow a fundamental change to the constitution to be decided on a narrow majority (52%/48%) in answer to a broad and general question on a highly charged and bitterly divisive issue. This is democracy reborn as ‘elective dictatorship’, to use Lord Hailsham’s term. In very broad terms this was the kind of matter that Madison very carefully constructed the US Constitution to avoid; he understood the intractable consequences that would follow. I will not rehearse them here. At the same time I am sceptical that the problems created by the referendum and the catastrophic Government demonstrated thereafter can be resolved in the UK by changing the ‘rules of engagement’ now: it is too late.
The problem is that the divisions in Britain are now deep, and very difficult to resolve. Party loyalty in an essentially Party Parliament has collapsed, and the electorate divides on Remain and Brexit, not Party terms. I must leave that recondite and unyielding problem with you.
I can only speculate on the art of the possible. Here is what seems to me, possible. Remain I propose on reasonable grounds (at least 62% of the electorate, probably more now) can be described as the settled will of the Scottish people. Remain, therefore is very important to Scotland, not just for the economic well-worn arguments that are only too well known; but for more fundamental reasons of basic future demographics (a marker of the long-term failure of the 300 year Union to deliver for Scotland since WWII); and because Scotland is intuitively a European country (a matter that was often lost in the fog of Empire), and even more fundamentally, has a long history of embracing a free Union with a bigger neighbour. Scotland’s embrace of the Union of Parliaments in 1707 had major adverse as well as favourable consequences (and most of the favourable consequences were long deferred). Union cost England the ‘Equivalent’ (a small quantum) and virtually nothing of significance; it was virtually all upside.
In Scotland we are very comfortable, very experienced and even very successful ‘outsiders’. England is not. The EU is far more important to Scotland, than it appears it ever can be for England. It may be that Brexit can force Scotland out of the EU, but very many of us will never be reconciled to that decision. The EU represents the present and the best representation we have in Europe of a necessary future. Britain represents a vanquished past. This is why it is not a matter of accepting that “Life will go on”. We have come to a crossroads. A Union that does not work for Scottish aspirations, and does not convincingly represent ‘the future’ cannot stand. Fortunately, Scotland can choose another course, if it must.
I think your discussion of comfort with the role of ‘ousider’ very pertinent
Johan G,
Not pedantry at all. I just repeated the error! 62% of those who voted in Scotland. I too stand corrected.
Mr Warren.
Many thanks for yur response. I don’t think we’re actually that far apart. Common ground my be established only via civilised debate which, as you note, is not characteristic of the discussion of Brexit.
I also appreciate your insights on Scotland’s position. It appears that many Scottish voters (if not even a majority) – and indeed many Welsh voters – are moving to a position where a majority of Irish voters were over a century ago. The far from perfect institutional functioning of the EU has been equally far from perfect in protecting the interests of small nations, particulalry when they conflict with the interests of the major member-states, but it has proved far, far better than any conceivable alternative.
Ireland, Portugal and Greece, to varying extents and for various reasons, were hung out to dry to prevent a perceived potentially catastrophic threat to the EU’s financial stability in the aftermath of the GFC. All three, to varying extents, took it on the chin and went through a painful process of recovery – with Ireland performing the best of the three. Partly in compensation and regret, but also in full defence of the EU’s legal order and of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement the rest of the EU is standing four-square behind Ireland. That should provide an assurance (and comfort) to Scottish and Welsh people that is not available from their current overlords.
As for the resolution of the UK’s withdrawal it’s probably best to move to Richard’s latest on the new “Corbyn Doctrine”.
PS. I stand corrected on Johan G’s point.
“GDP per capita is over twice as high in IE than NI”
Yes because the tax rate for Apple and other American corporations is 100 times lower!
Ireland obviously got a terrible deal from the union but the reason that Holland developed was due to having an Empire to pillage. An independent Ireland in the 19th century with no imperial possessions to steal wealth from would still be relatively under developed compared to the countries accumulating capital at gun point.
Irish GDP is utterly meaningless for the reason you note
Only GNI counts in this context
“Irish GDP is utterly meaningless for the reason you note”
No country’s GDP is much use as a metric anyway.
But I take the point that Irish GDP is distorted against an already useless metric. As long as politicians are relying on GDP to be meaningful for shaping policy we are in trouble, aren’t we ?
Yes